accommodation and heating costs, which are provided for under the German social code (Sozialgesetzbuch ('SGB') II). Both applications were refused by the Jobcenter Leipzig on the grounds of §7(1) SGB II 6 and §23(3) SGB XII 7 which allow authorities to deny social assistance to foreign nationals who have entered Germany either with a view to obtaining such assistance or whose right of residence is based solely on the search for 5 See Regulation (EU) 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union; Article 48 TFEU relating to social security; Article 114(4)-(5) TFEU on protection of the working environment; and, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 29 April 2004, on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 6 §7(1) excludes "foreign nationals whose right of residence arises solely out of the search for employment and their family members" as beneficiaries. 7 §23(3) states that "foreign nationals who have entered national territory in order to obtain social assistance or whose right of residence arises solely out of the search for employment, and their family members, have no right to social assistance." employment. In July 2012, Ms Dano brought an action before the Social Court, Leipzig (Sozialgericht Leipzig) challenging the Jobcenter's decision on the grounds that it was incompatible with EU law, in particular, article 18 TFEU 8 and article 45 TFEU 9 In its fourth question, the Social Court questioned the applicability of the CFR to the facts of the case.
The CJEU issued its judgment on 11 November 2014. In its answer to the first question, the Court agreed with the finding of Advocate General Wathelet 12 that special noncontributory cash benefits such as those at issue in this case fall within the scope of article 4 of Regulation 883/2004. Such benefits were intended for persons who are fit to work and their family members. As the objective of the benefits at issue is to provide basic provision so as to "enable its beneficiaries to lead a life in keeping with human dignity" 13 , they can also be classed as "social assistance" within the meaning of Directive provided they have sufficient resources not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.
The CJEU then went on to examine the second and third questions together by first reiterating the fundamental nature of EU citizenship which allows EU citizens to be able to rely on the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality found in article 18 TFEU and given more specific expression in article 24 (1) 
ANALYSIS
While the judgment in Dano has been welcomed by policymakers, politicians and the media in Germany as not only clarifying the law but also allowing them to restrict access to benefits for those migrants who are not in employment thus preserving some national autonomy over social security systems 21 , the CJEU's reasoning leaves a number of questions unanswered. Based on the tone of the judgment, it is clear that the Court was acutely aware of the political debates surrounding the free movement of EU citizens which have been taking place in a number of Member States. 22 In allowing Germany to restrict benefits to EU citizens such as Ms Dano, the CJEU has appeased politicians in those countries where Eurosceptic parties are gaining in popularity, such as the UK. The British Prime Minister David Cameron has praised the judgment as "simple common sense" 23 and has welcomed it as allowing the government to restrict access to noncontributory social benefits such as housing benefits and tax credits for EU citizens who are not workers, job seekers or former workers. 24 At the same time, however, in denying Member States provided (articles 6(1) and 7(1)(b)) they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members so as not to become a burden on the State's social assistance system. Once citizens fulfil the requirements of the Directive, they are entitled to equal treatment with nationals of the host Member State. The Directive's provisions in this regard codify the CJEU's case law which, prior to the entry into force of the Directive, required economically inactive citizens "not to become an unreasonable burden on the public finances" 25 or to demonstrate either "a genuine link with the employment market of the State concerned" 26 or "a certain degree of integration into the society of the host State" 27 before they could benefit from equal treatment and gain access to welfare benefits. However, neither the case law nor the Directive clarified the precise nature of when an applicant could be considered to be a 'burden'; which benefits can be regarded as social assistance; and, whether Member States could require citizens to be lawfully resident before accessing benefits.
In its judgment in Brey 28 , the CJEU attempted to answer some of these questions. It recognised that "the competent national authorities have the power to assess, taking into account a range of factors in the light of the principle of proportionality, whether the grant of a social security benefit could place a burden on that Member State's social assistance system as a whole." 29 In Dano, the CJEU held that economically inactive EU citizens are only entitled to equal treatment with nationals in respect of access to benefits once they fulfil the residence conditions contained in the Directive. The level of 'sufficient resources' for this purpose is to be determined in the light of individual circumstances without taking into account the social benefits claimed. In comparison to Brey, the Court did not refer to financial solidarity between Member States but instead referenced recital 10 of the preamble 32 of the Directive to justify its decision to make the right to equal treatment conditional upon fulfilling the residence criteria contained in the Directive. 33 By simply referring to an individual assessment, the judgment in Dano accords Member States a wider margin of discretion than Brey and simplifies the number of criteria that national authorities need to take into account. Such an approach is highly unsatisfactory from the point of view of legal certainty. 34 The Court has also created the paradox that economically inactive citizens may only apply for benefits if they have sufficient resources to support themselves. Yet citizens who have sufficient resources are unlikely to claim or need social assistance. The CJEU neither clarifies whether citizens who do not have sufficient resources are automatically considered to be a burden nor does it set the parameters of 30 Ibid. 31 Para 64. 32 Recital 10 states that: "Persons exercising their right of residence should not, however, become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during an initial period of residence. Therefore, the right of residence for Union citizens and their family members for periods in excess of three months should be subject to conditions." 33 Second, the Court's approach conflicts with its previous case law on the free movement of workers where it has held that the motives underlying an individual's decision to exercise their Treaty rights were of no relevance provided he "pursues or wishes to pursue an effective and genuine activity." 37 While the Court, unlike a number of Advocates General 38 , has never applied the same reasoning to economically inactive EU citizens, it is now clear that different rules apply when there may be a possibility of abuse in the latter case. In treating workers and economically inactive EU citizens differently, the CJEU is dismantling the all-encompassing nature of EU citizenship.
EU citizenship, as a fundamental right without the need for any exercise of an economic activity 39 is guaranteed by the Treaty (articles 20-21 TFEU) and confirmed by the case law of the CJEU. In Grzelczyk 40 , the Court held that Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States which includes a general right to equal treatment in law 41 and a prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality. 42 It has been suggested that the principle has constitutional status in EU law. 43 following the enlargements has already resulted in "opposition to the EU [becoming] increasingly embedded both at European and national levels" which has "propelled the EU into an unprecedented phase of uncertainty, contributing to deeper and more embedded Euroscepticism with the potential to cause irreparable damage to the EU's quest for legitimacy and stability." 59 While the judgment in Dano has been welcomed by politicians in a number of Member States as allowing them to exclude EU citizens from access to social benefits, its long-term consequences may be more damaging if it creates an impoverished class of citizens which undermine social cohesion within the Member States.
Finally, the judgment is disappointing in respect of the CJEU's unwillingness to engage with the CFR. As EU law does not lay down the conditions creating and defining the right to the benefits in question -competence lies with the Member States -the Court found that the CFR did not apply. At first glance, by refusing Ms Dano equal treatment in access to benefits and recognising that she did not have a right to reside in Germany under the Directive, the CJEU denied the application of EU law to the applicant in the case. It thereby follows that the CFR should not apply. Article 153(2) TFEU allows the EU to adopt minimum requirements in the area of social security and social protection of workers. This provision has never been used and Member States retain sovereignty in the sphere of social protection. Nonetheless, Member States are not immune from complying with EU law when regulating in this area. In Kohll 60 , the Court confirmed that while Member States are free to organise their social security systems, they must comply with EU law when exercising these powers; this is particularly the case in relation to the Treaty's provisions on the free movement of persons. 61 Verschueren argues that "in Dano the [CJEU] defines the possibilities the Member States have to abstain from applying the equal treatment provisions to Union citizens claiming social benefits." As such, Member States must comply with EU law when granting EU citizens' access to social benefits. Refusal of such benefits on the grounds of the Directive for him "is definitely part of the implementation of EU law and should therefore respect the provisions of the EU Charter." 62 On a broader level, the CJEU's unwillingness to engage with the CFR's provisions limits the usefulness of its rights. The CFR's scope is broader than the general principles provided under EU law and it has been suggested that a progressive interpretation by the CJEU may result in the discovery of new general principles. 63 Application of the CFR, particularly article 1 which guarantees human dignity, to the facts of the case could have fundamentally altered its outcome especially if the CJEU had taken an approach similar to that of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 64 In its recent case law, the ECtHR has recognised that a State may be obliged to provide support to an individual in situations of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity. 65 Similarly, in Tarakhel v Switzerland 66 , the ECtHR confirmed that states have a duty to provide shelter and basic social services to asylum seekers, especially families with small children. While Ms Dano and her 5 year old son, as EU citizens, are not limited, like the asylum seekers in Tarakhel, by an inability to return to their home countries, their stay in Germany following the ruling in Dano is precarious; they are "'illegal' EU migrants without free movement rights" 67 and are at risk of living in poverty. 68 With the CJEU taking a restrictive approach to EU free movement rights, the ECtHR may be an alternative route for EU citizens deprived of their right to equal treatment under the Directive.
CONCLUSION
At a time when public opposition to the EU is growing across the Member States, the judgment in Dano makes political sense. In deciding that economically inactive EU citizens must fulfil the criteria for lawful residence contained in Directive 2004/38 before being entitled to equal treatment with nationals of the host state, the CJEU has avoided pouring fuel into the fire by tempering the debate surrounding the free movement of EU citizens which is raging in a number of Member States. However, the judgment is unsatisfactory from the point of view of legal certainty and fails to engage with the consequences of its findings for national authorities and economically inactive EU citizens. The approach has the potential to create a 'sub class' of EU citizens who are living in a host Member State without being entitled to equal treatment with nationals; in effect undermining social cohesion across the EU. Finally, by redefining the scope of EU citizenship in this way, the CJEU is undermining the Grzelczyk 69 paradigm whereby EU citizenship is the fundamental status of citizens of the Member States. The Court has the opportunity to reconsider these issues in a number of pending cases 70 and it is to be hoped that these will enable it to clarify its case law.
